Ghana

WCC sent me on a no expenses paid trip to Milton Keynes to see Ghana’s final World Cup warm-up against Latvia. Prior to this game, Ghana had been beaten 4-1 by Holland, so it was important to put in a decent showing against a lesser team. Latvia are no international lightweights (they finished third in their World Cup 2010 qualifying group behind Switzerland and Greece) but Ghana needed to beat a team of this stature to indicate that they have any chance of making it into the knock-out rounds in South Africa. Ghana have been drawn in a tough group (Group D) with Germany, Australia and Serbia – there is no makeweight amongst this quartet. If they make it out of their group, Ghana could face England in the second round.

Ghana performed well against Latvia. They are solid where they need to be, and skilful where they need to be, looking very dangerous on the break. Whilst they dominated the game, they did lack a little cutting edge in the final third. They could have scored several in the first-half but lacked composure in front of goal, although an Asamoah Gyan effort did strike the bar. The game became less coherent in the second-half following substitutions, but Ghana won late in the game when Quincy Owusu-Abeyie made space for himself to strike a long-range shot – it should have been saved by the Latvian keeper but found the net. Ghana could well make it out of Group D, but will need to be more clinical in South Africa. [I’ve summarised the team performance below.]

Defence
Apart from goalkeeper Daniel Adjei (who flapped horribly at one cross) the defence looked very secure. Samuel Inkoom is a dangerous and skilful right-back, whilst his counterpart on the left, Lee Addy also looked secure. Inkoom seems to offer a bit more fizz than Addy, but did seem to have greater license to advance. The centre-backs looked strong but also tidy on the ball, with Isaac Vorsah particularly commanding.

Midfield
Ghana played a 4-2-3-1 for the majority of the game with Anthony Annan and Kevin-Prince Boateng anchoring the midfield. They both performed well, Annan’s tenacity and snappiness complementing Boateng’s composure and clever use of the ball. In front of this pair, Kwadwo Asamoah took up playmaking duties. He played one lovely through-ball to Prince Tagoe which enabled the winger to advance into the 18-yard box. Asamoah also looked sharp on the break, making space to strike a curling shot on another occasion. He sits fairly deep to pick out assertive passes and does not often move forward to join Gyan in attack. The two wide players, Andre Ayew and Prince Tagoe looked very skilful and could trouble full-backs in South Africa, but their crossing was far from pinpoint. Ayew looked particularly tricky, beating opponents on several occasions.

Forwards
Asamoah Gyan played as lone forward and performed ably. He was unlucky in the first-half when his shot hit the underside of the crossbar then landed on the goal-line. He also looked quick and powerful on the break, and like Asamoah, shot wide having evaded the Latvian defence outside the box. Dominic Adiyiah replaced Gyan in the second-half but made little impression. Quincy Owusu-Abeyie scored the winner and showed good pace following his introduction, although his runs in from the right flank were usually overambitious. However, he could be a useful impact substitute at World Cup 2010.

England team v USA

Capello should stick with Plan A against USA, even if Gareth Barry is unavailable. Michael Carrick can support Frank Lampard in central-midfield with Steven Gerrard retaining his position at left-midfield. Against Mexico, Carrick and James Milner failed to strike up a convincing partnership – but the team as a whole was overrun in the first-half. It was also a raw pairing, as Milner had never played in central-midfield for England before. With Lampard as partner, Carrick should be more assured.
 
If Capello does not have sufficient confidence in Carrick, then Gerrard may start in the middle next to Lampard. It shouldn’t really be a mystery why this feverishly scrutinised combination has never flourished. Central-midfield can be configured in many ways, but fielding two attacking midfielders in a 4-4-2 doesn’t seem to be one of them! Despite this, the England national team persisted for several years with the deployment of two attack-minded central-midfielders, neither of which seemed to have been allocated clear defensive responsibilities. In the absence of Owen Hargreaves and Barry, and with Tom Huddlestone and Carrick failing to convince completely, Capello could be forced to reinvent a Gerrard/Lampard central combination.
 
I refuse to countenance that Lampard and Gerrard’s inclusion in central-midfield would be a reversion to the Eriksson 4-1-3-2, with two players oscillating uneasily between defensive and attacking duties! Capello’s 4-4-2 is closer to a 4-2-3-1, as the two central midfielders (usually Barry and Lampard) tend to sit quite deep. With a secure midfield a key element of Capello’s plans thus far, it is unlikely he will eschew security by replacing Barry with an attack-oriented player. If it is decided that Gerrard offers greater presence than Carrick in midfield, then he could be played next to Lampard with both having the core brief to shield the back four. Joe Cole is the ideal replacement for Gerrard for the inside-left role, if the latter does move centrally. However, it would be preferable to use Carrick next to Lampard, as the Gerrard/Lampard axis would provide the team with insufficient defensive ballast.

The US tend to play a 4-4-2/4-4-1-1 formation and might not give England the run around like continental or South American sides, which tend to deploy heavily resourced midfields. The US will still be stern opponents and with players such as Landon Donovan, Clint Dempsey and Michael Bradley in their line-up, it is crucial to retain a defensively focused partner for Lampard. The US might be best served by 4-4-1-1 with Donovan located centrally to take advantage of England’s diluted central-midfield. However, Ricardo Clark and Bradley should hopefully be occupied by Gerrard and Rooney, whilst Carrick (and Lampard) can marshall Donovan if he lines up behind Altidore. (Dempsey could also take up this support striker slot.) With control over central areas attained, England’s wide players can press on down the flanks.
 
For reasons discussed elsewhere on WCC, Wayne Rooney should be provided with a strike-partner rather than spearheading the attack as a lone forward. Aaron Lennon should be first choice for right-midfield, but Milner, Joe Cole and Shaun Wright-Phillips are handy alternatives. I’ve opted for Ledley King as Rio Ferdinand’s replacement at centre-back. Even with his dodgy knee, King should still be able to play the first and third group matches, the quarter-final and the final!

Zeno’s Paradoxes

Zeno of Elea devised several paradoxical conundra to demonstrate the problematic nature of our perception of space and time. His paradoxes suggest that motion and change are illusory phenomena.
 
In his famous paradox, Achilles and the Tortoise the two eponymous characters race one another. The tortoise is given a start of a specified distance – say 50 metres. Achilles is faster than the tortoise but for every stretch of distance covered by the former, the latter also covers a stretch of ground. For example, when Achilles has run 10 metres, the tortoise will have covered one metre. Every time Achilles advances the tortoise will also have proceeded; this means that Achilles has continually more ground to make up in his attempt to win the race. This ongoing process means that Achilles has to cover an infinite range of points which the tortoise has already covered, which means that Achilles can never catch up. 

BBC pundit Alan Hansen once said something along the lines of ‘pace is no longer a luxury in football, it’s a necessity’. But Achilles and the Tortoise demonstrates that pace is actually redundant. The real necessity is a keen footballing brain which enables appropriate on-pitch positioning. Intelligent players will ensure they have a headstart over their opponents when running for the ball – it is then impossible for their rivals to catch them! The paradox therefore explains why a great “reader” of the game like former England forward Teddy Sheringham was able to continue playing top-flight club football up until the age of 67.  So we don’t need to concern ourselves with the pace of opposition forwards in South Africa; as long as John Terry maintains a small headstart then he must always make it to the ball first. 

However, a more extreme problem suggested by Zeno is represented in his dichotomy paradox. When moving towards a designated point we must first of all get half-way there, and before that a quarter of the way there, and before that an eighth of the way there, and so on. Each distance can be halved and this abridged distance can also be halved. This means that an infinite number of stages must be traversed, which means we can never reach our destination, even when this spatial target is itself motionless.  A match played with strict reference to the dichotomy principle would not be much of a spectacle: as kick-off would take an infinite amount of time, there’s little chance that many goals would be scored within 90 minutes.

As motion is an illusion there is really no need for teams preparing for World Cup 2010 to worry about tactics, technique or fitness. Football is not about movement of either the players or the ball, as motion is impossible. Empirical evidence does call these views into question, however, which is why these problems are paradoxical. It will thus be a brave coach who decides to embrace a ‘stationary team’ policy based on insight from Zeno’s paradoxes. England didn’t move much at the last World Cup, and this did appear to reduce their effectiveness quite considerably!

World Cup 2010 Predictions

Which teams and players are going to the top in South Africa – and which are going to flop?

In addition to my forecasts, WCC contributors Dr Neil and Dr Paul have submitted their predictions. US correspondent Dr Mike also provides his views, whilst Dr Colin actually has a real doctorate (in Organic Chemistry).

Dr Ted

Winners: Holland

2nd – Argentina
3rd – England
4th – Cameroon

Best of the rest: USA
Top of the flops: France
Golden Boot: Peter Crouch
Golden Ball: Wesley Sneijder

Dr Neil

Winners: Spain

2nd – Brazil
3rd – Argentina
4th - England

Best of the rest: Holland
Top of the flops: Italy
Golden Boot: David Villa 
Golden Ball: Lionel Messi

Dr Paul

Winners: Brazil

2nd – England (because they have a nice route to the semis)
3rd – Spain
4th - Uruguay

Best of the rest: Holland
Top of the flops: France
Golden Boot: Luis Suarez
Golden Ball: Xavi

Dr Mike

Winners: Spain

2nd – Brazil
3rd – Germany
4th – England

Best of the rest: Uruguay
Top of the flops: Ivory Coast
Golden Boot: David Villa
Golden Ball: Kaka

Dr Colin

Winners: Spain

2nd – England
3rd – Holland
4th – Argentina

Best of the rest: Brazil
Top of the flops: Italy
Golden Boot: David Villa
Golden Ball: Xavi

Heads or Tails?

Our ancestors survived because they grasped that the world follows patterned sequences of events, for example, weather has seasonal variations and night follows day. As pattern recognition is such a core feature of the human psyche, there is a tendency to seek meaningful form and purpose even when events are random or contingent.

In addition, because human beings relate to their immediate environment through personal intent and reason, they fallaciously seek to understand the external natural world with reference to these faculties. Humans therefore draw associations between insentient natural processes and their own existence. Astrology provides an example of this predilection: some humans consider that the (anthropocentrically perceived) alignment of distant celestial bodies makes a significant impact upon their lives.  As self-focused survival machines, we have a tendency to consider that the whole universe relates to our immediate personal circumstances. It is also comforting to believe that we exist within a purposeful cosmic order.

The outcome of both of these tendencies can be observed in gameshows such as ‘Deal or No Deal’ and ‘Heads or Tails’. In the latter, the show is based on a sequence of coin tosses. Instead of recognizing this as a completely random exercise, the participants apparently agonize over their choices and ask the audience for help. Statements such as “I’m going with my gut” are also made by the contestant. However, no amount of consideration, whether through intellectual reasoning or intuition has any impact upon the outcome, which is purely 50/50. This provides a public demonstration of humans looking for meaningful patterns where there can’t possibly be any, and believing that personal intent has a causal relationship with a random sequence of events.

Further examples of this tendency are apparent with national responses to England’s showing at major football tournaments. The public perceive that the side’s performances provide meaningful representations of the nation’s status. For example, our elimination represents a cultural or structural failing, such as declining moral rectitude or lack of investment in grassroots football. Or the failure is ascribed to the clueless coach and his gang of under-motivated, overpaid players. However, Kuper & Syzmanksi highlight that success for England is actually more random than we conceive on an a priori basis. When playing teams of similar ability at the World Cup (which happens particularly in the knock-out phase) England are presented with what is, essentially, a sequence of coin tosses. With four ‘coin tosses’ deciding the games from the second round to the final, England basically have a 6.25% chance of winning the tournament! The only time England have won the World Cup is when home advantage weighted the coin tosses slightly in their favour.

Fans also consider that their personal intent and pride are inextricably linked with the side. Because we are cognitively predisposed to relate our personal circumstances to external events and occurrences, we have little difficulty developing an affinity with a group of people (that we’ve never met) representing us, via shared nationality, in a sporting tournament. That’s why fans at home will be ‘willing the side on’ in South Africa. And when England are knocked out we will take this failure personally, even though it was nothing to do with us. Then we can seek the patterns underlying this failure, which will leave no social or cultural stone unturned!

England: Plan A (and B)

England: Plan A

England’s plan A has been palpably apparent from early in the qualification campaign. Fabio Capello fields an approximate 4-4-2 formation with a conservative central midfield and a target-man centre-forward.

Gareth Barry and Frank Lampard take the central-midfield slots with Barry the more defensive of the two, but Lampard is more constrained than he was under previous England regimes. Steven Gerrard takes up the left-midfield berth but has licence to drift infield to influence the play. However, the fitness of Barry is crucial, as England lack another central-midfielder who can provide similar stability next to Lampard. If Barry is not ready for the start of the tournament then Gerrard could move centrally (with Joe Cole taking up the left-midfield berth) but Capello should perhaps put his faith in Michael Carrick, so that midfield restraint is maintained.

With the left-midfielder tucking in from the flank, it is important to have an attacking left-back in place so that width is not compromised – Ashley Cole performs this role. To prevent the team from collapsing into central congestion, a touchline hugging right-midfielder (such as Aaron Lennon) is fielded.

With Wayne Rooney dropping deep and wide in search of space, and Lampard and Barry taking up constrained roles, 4-2-3-1 is implicit in Capello’s 4-4-2 – but Rooney is more of a forward than an advanced central midfielder, so I would argue that it is principally 4-4-2. At the apex of the team structure, Peter Crouch is likely to take up the target-man role, which he has taken over from Emile Heskey – although ‘target-man’ is something of a misnomer with Capello reducing the team’s dependence on a wasteful long-ball game. Other leading nations do not seem to require a space-creating, toiling centre-forward: if Capello was Spain’s coach then I don’t think that he’d be trawling La Liga to find the Spanish Heskey! But Capello has to work with the available resources, and Villa and Torres aren’t available! England have one outstanding forward (Rooney) and his best performances at international level have occurred when a target-man has played just in front of him. This prevents Rooney from being preoccupied with the buffeting of reinforced international central-defences, and he thus has more scope to exploit the narrow margins of space which are available. Jermain Defoe is available if Capello is seeking a different type of partner for Rooney.
 
Capello’s preferred topological arrangement is a flexible framework more than a fixed formation. This approach can become a more recognizable 4-2-3-1 with Gerrard taking up a more defined central role with Rooney stationed on the left. This Plan B has been put into place when England have been overrun in central areas, for example during the qualifier against Belarus in Minsk. This can also become a more assertive 4-3-3 when required with Rooney and the right-winger pushing forwards. The shortcoming of these adjustments is that it removes Rooney from areas of central influence – but sometimes the structure has to be tweaked to meet the requirements of a game. A more populist approach would be to field Rooney at centre-forward under a 4-2-3-1 with Gerrard in an advanced central-midfield position. (WCC has explored this as England’s Plan C.) Whilst it holds obvious appeal this would be a less flexible policy: an in-game switch to 4-4-2 would require a substitution, as only one designated forward features in the starting XI. Capello also had a look at this approach against Japan, but with Joe Cole behind Rooney.

Fans and pundits will continue to scrutinize the England set-up. But Capello seems to have several bases covered with a flexible Plan A at his disposal! And ultimately it is this flexible approach which took England to South Africa with some ease.

Headline Competition

WCC’s precursor World Cup Hippo ran a mildly popular predict the headline competition for the last World Cup.
 
We are therefore asking our readership to devise some possible newspaper headlines which might adorn the back pages this summer. To set the tone, we’ve kicked off with a couple of examples below. Please leave your entries (and a little explanatory text if required) in the comments box.

Hand of Drog
Roo Beauty
Chile Gone Barmy
Let’s Go Foul a Kuyt
New Zealand suffer half-Nelsen [Ryan Nelsen is sent off just before half-time]

Steven Gerrard & decision-making stress

Steven Gerrard was accommodated in the England side for many years as a result of his lofty reputation and club form. This was despite the fact that his performances at international level were consistently disappointing. Within a supportive club context at Liverpool, Gerrard flourishes in a central role. With two defensive midfielders bolstering the team, Gerrard usually plays an advanced central position for Liverpool (usually) behind Fernando Torres. A little further back in time, Dietmar Hamann provided the defensive shield which reduced Gerrard’s defensive concerns.
 
For England, the team set-up has been less able to provide the reinforcements to support his talismanic attributes. In addition the fear of vilification is greater when playing for England, when performances are considered to represent the nation. At international level, Gerrrard formed a much maligned pairing with Frank Lampard with neither player looking comfortable in the absence of a genuine defensive-midfielder. But nor did Gerrard really assert himself on the few occasions he was allocated to a more advanced central role. For example, when Sven Goran-Eriksson placed a holding player behind Gerrard and Lampard at World Cup 2006, this failed to spark any upturn in performance. Gerrard’s place within the national team might have come under threat if his form had remained indifferent. But Fabio Capello struck upon a ploy that has significantly boosted Gerrard’s displays for England: he now tends to play in a nominal left-sided role with licence to drift infield.

It may have seemed that a laissez-faire, work it out yourself approach would be the best way to stimulate creativity and attacking proclivities. Free from constraint, the artist or performer is free to express themselves in any manner that they see fit. In actuality, exercising a craft in a formless context with no clear brief can be psychologically constricting. It is the blank canvas which engenders anxious inertia! Sawrey & Weisz also highlight the links between stress and decision-making. In fact, decision-making is stress. When electric shocks were administered randomly to rats they did not develop gastric ulcers. However, when they needed to walk over an electric grid to obtain food and water, thereby making a decision whether to attain a shock or not, then ulcers developed. The narrower parameters of an inside-left role have provided a firmer but more facilitative prescription of action for Gerrard. Excessive decision-making within a more demanding central role (within a context that is more oriented to hostility than his club environment) had previously neutralised Gerrard’s effectiveness. Gerrard still takes up central positions for England when required, but this is a clear tactical response initiated by the coach. When left for 90 minutes to forge an on-pitch relationship with a non-complementary central midfielder whilst living up to excessive national expectation, the decision-making stress was too high.

Capello didn’t just place Gerrard on the left in a vain endeavour to fix the problem of England’s midfield. He reconfigured the side to enable the most talented players to operate effectively within the same team. He also reduced some of the psychological pressure by reducing decision-making stress, whilst bequeathing the clear but flexible parameters within which players such as Gerrard could confidently express their skills. However, Gerrard was used with Lampard in central-midfield against Japan, with both of them sitting behind advanced midfielder Joe Cole for the majority of the second-half. With Owen Hargreaves unavailable, Barry struggling to make it for the start of the tournament and the other central-midfield options failing to convince, Capello could be forced to field Gerrard and Lampard in the middle again. Landon Donovan and co will hope to benefit from the increase in decision-making stress across England’s midfield!