From the WCC archive

WCC has been running in earnest since January. Here are a few articles you may have missed from each of our faculties. Click on the article title to view.

Physical Sciences
Wonders of the Capello System – Emile Heskey is Saturn; and why you can’t pair a comet with a moon in attack.
Adidas Jabulani – philosophical questions raised by this perfect orb.

Arts and Law
Defoe v Heskey = Category Mistake – Defoe cannot be divided by Heskey without remainder.
Being and Nothingness – how football matches are shaped by competing aspirations to pour-soi status.

Life Sciences
Motivation and Sexual Selection – it’s the WAG watching in the stand (not the pay packet) which is why players keep on running.
Home Advantage – insights from a study into speckled wood butterflies.

Social Sciences
The Bancroft Gardens – backless benches equal international failure.
Capello: Keynesian Reformer – interventionist tactical reforms required to address Sven Goran Eriksson’s laissez-faire legacy.

Panini ‘83 exposes Hoddle

Detailed visual analysis of historical documents can provide a rich source of insight into cultural phenomena. With a retrospective vantage point stirred into the mix, visual cues can attain a starker complexion once they have been weathered by the brutal march of time.

The Panini football album of 1983 provides us with a rich legacy of visual images. The acquisition of a new album every season was a key rite of passage throughout middle childhood – stickers would be purchased with pocket money and swaps would be made in the playground.

In ‘Football 83′ Panini decided to display full frontal images of the players posing in their kits: the previous albums used to show only head and shoulder shots. A few curiosities are apparent in the ‘83 edition: for example, Alan Curtis of Swansea appears to be wearing his slippers. But perhaps the crucial finding from a visual analysis perspective involves the picture of Tottenham and England midfielder Glenn Hoddle. Every other player photographed from top flight clubs has managed to pose for a picture, but for some reason Hoddle is not shown in this format and an ‘in game’ shot has been utilised instead.* The reasons for this anomaly can only be inferred but, with hindsight, Hoddle’s stand-alone status from the 308 other pictured players and managers offers some explanation for how his career developed. Hoddle was a talented playmaker who never replicated his club form at international level: perhaps this is because he was unable to have his mercurial whims satisfied when playing at international level.

Following his playing career Hoddle did progress to become England manager, taking the side to the World Cup in 1998. Controversially, Hoddle did not include England’s playmaker from that particular period, Paul Gascoigne in the squad. With confirmation of Hoddle’s aspirations to ‘lone genius’ status confirmed by Panini, it now appears that Gascoigne’s exclusion was never in doubt. Hoddle also aligned himself with some rather cranky ideas and practices which included association with a faith healer, Eileen Drury and filling the players with a range of substances from the local apothecary. Graeme Le Saux reports in his autobiography how he suspects that the use of caffeine pills led to him experiencing cramp in the second round match against Argentina.

If only the 1983 Panini album had been consulted, this could all have been avoided. Analysis shows that players such as Ipswich Town’s Kevin Steggles managed to conform to Panini’s reasonable request to pose for a snap. Maybe he could have led us to World Cup glory in 1998! 

* This point is discredited somewhat by the fact that one sticker is missing from my album - Jake Findlay the Luton Town goalkeeper. If anyone with the 1983 album could complete our sample this would be greatly appreciated. A scanned image can be sent to: dr.ted@worldcupcollege.com

The Capello Project: testing times

World Cup 2010 is following an all too familiar pattern for England. Hope has been quickly replaced by disappointment. Perhaps the disappointment is more acute in this instance as the qualification campaign was so emphatic. However, England are undefeated in South Africa! They performed adequately against their principal group rivals USA in their first game, and would probably have been victorious if an unfortunate Robert Green error hadn’t gifted the US an equalizer. England also contrived more penetrative attacks against the US than they managed throughout the whole of World Cup 2006! But national negativity has arisen following a dismal draw against Algeria. The performance was very flat and the players appeared to be beset by nerves: the collective showing was bereft of vitality.

The inevitable response to such situations is to apportion blame, and this usually falls on the coach. Fabio Capello fielded his Plan A against Algeria with Gareth Barry and Frank Lampard in central midfield, Wayne Rooney supported by Emile Heskey in attack, and Steven Gerrard a nominal left-sided midfielder. England are undefeated when adopting this approach and it had worked well over the qualifiers. It’s therefore something of a knee-jerk reaction to criticise Capello after one dreary showing. Following a poor performance, it’s all too easy to offer alternatives which would have worked better – as these won’t be exacted to the rigours of analysis.

The regular national past time of lambasting an individual for failing to turn a group of second-tier international footballers into world beaters is a little tedious. The specific attributes of the coach are always considered a hindrance to the team: Sven Goran Eriksson was the uninspiring accountant-type, Steve McClaren the flip-flopping wally with a brolly – and now Capello will be the obtuse, autocratic Italian.

The media/public consensus suggests that playing Wayne Rooney as a lone forward is the panacea; but after his lethargic showing against Algeria this doesn’t seem to be a sound course of action. At World Cup 2006, Eriksson was actually blamed for frustrating Rooney by isolating him in attack. As with all England managers Capello will be damned if he does, damned if he doesn’t! There is also some suggestion that Capello is wedded to 4-4-2, but he has used this as a flexible framework throughout his tenure and 4-2-3-1 and 4-3-3 have been visible at times with players rotating positions.

The next stage of the psychological damage limitation process will be to deliberate over structural and cultural aspects of English football, such as the surfeit of overseas players in the Premier League, and unsophisticated Anglo Saxon styles of play. But perhaps more contingent and isolated factors play a part. England’s qualification campaign gained confidence and momentum following a good win against Croatia and this was facilitated in part by Robert Kovac’s (appropriate) sending off. Alas, a Robert Green error prevented England’s World Cup from starting on the right foot and, accordingly, fear of failure and vilification permeated the side against Algeria. An emphatic victory against Slovenia is required for confidence to be restored. But the wheels of doom are already in motion: for all Capello’s sound and consistent team building, it only takes one unfortunate error to kickstart the fear/blame cycle. Positive momentum could help England to the latter stages of the tournament, but a squad permeated by negativity can only flounder so far. But, of course, when England fail it will be because Capello didn’t do the obvious and play a 4-4-1-1 with Rooney in attack and Joe Cole sitting in the hole blah blah blah…

England 0 Algeria 0

England put in a very listless performance against Algeria. They started strongly enough and within five minutes Steven Gerrard found himself in the box, but he made the wrong decision in eschewing a strike at goal. This lack of confidence exemplified England’s performance – they failed to build upon their reasonable start and began to look edgy and laboured. They were arranged under a 4-4-2 formation, but Gerrard’s presence on the left was less than nominal as he took up a defined central-midfield position. In response, Algeria played a 3-4-2-1 formation and pressed England well, and Les Fennecs were on top for a significant period of the first-half, putting in several dangerous crosses.

England did respond although it was far from explosive stuff: the advanced players linked up well on a few occasions but were mostly limited to long-range efforts. However, a good chance fell to Frank Lampard following an Aaron Lennon cross, but Lampard didn’t connect emphatically with his left foot and M’Bolhi saved. No individual player performed particularly badly in the first period, but as a collective effort it was nervous, stilted and ponderous.

Fabio Capello has usually intervened when England have failed to fire in the past, but it was not possible to discern any meaningful input from the coach on this occasion. The second-half continued in much the same manner, with England players failing to connect with each other consistently. Nothing really went right for them – poor touches and misplaced passes were plentiful and indicated the players’ uneasiness. A couple of attacking moves were contrived but there was no end product. Gerrard was played into the box, but again he looked for a pass when a shot was on. With 15 minutes to go, Lampard and Gerrard linked up outside the box but substitute Jermain Defoe could not latch onto the through-ball. But these were merely fleeting glimpses, and an England breakthrough felt painfully distant.

England will need to beat Slovenia on Wednesday to ignite their tournament. This was a remarkably flat performance, and a confidence boosting victory is much needed. If the form displayed in this game continues, then World Cup 2010 will be over quite soon for Capello’s boys! [Player ratings below.]

6 Jamie Carragher: A solid display, marred by a yellow card which puts him out of the Slovenia game.
6 Ashley Cole: On his own on the left, he was defensively sound without showing much in attack.
6 Gareth Barry: Although he didn’t seize hold of midfield, he was fairly assured in possession upon his return to the side.
6 David James: The little he had to do, he did well enough. Took one tricky cross well.

5 John Terry: Like Carragher, he was solid enough but one back-pass was badly underhit.
5 Glen Johnson: A couple of errors and not much presence supporting attacks.
5 Frank Lampard: Tidy in possession in the first-half, he didn’t impose himself sufficiently overall.
5 Steven Gerrard: Made a couple of poor decisions in advanced positions, but he still linked up well with teammates on occasions.
5 Aaron Lennon: Apart from a couple of nice crosses, he made little impression on his flank.

4 Emile Heskey: Worked hard but he never really got hold of the ball; mishit one cross badly and crossed on another occasion when he should have shot.
4 Wayne Rooney: His touch was poor and his involvement was slight – a worrying display from England’s talisman.

Formations: Cartesian Coordinates or Dasein?

Scientific models are not physical representations of reality in the way that flat-pack assembly instructions represent furniture, but are images which assist us to comprehend a highly complex physical world. For example, the molecules that we breathe can be represented as tiny spheres bouncing off one another. Molecules behave as if they were tiny spheres, but this does not mean that they are tiny spheres: a scientific model is a visual aid to the imagination, illuminating processes which exist beyond the limits of our sensory experience.

A football formation could be regarded as a scientific model that helps us to understand a mutable topological arrangement which constantly alters over the temporal course of the game. During a match we do not see the players organized under a neat symmetrical formation. Formations such as 4-4-2 are therefore an aid to the imagination, and should demonstrate players’ approximate positions in relation to one another. To qualify as a scientific model, this representation could be expressed via mathematical equations. Using averaged positions based on where players touch the ball during a game would provide the underpinnings necessary to confirm that formations are scientific models. A Cartesian coordinate system would therefore capture the spatial location of each player: this should tally with formational representations to a meaningful degree.
 
However, based upon Cartesian coordinates, formations are poor representations of on-pitch reality. We should be able to make predictions from scientific models, but formations do not provide sound predictions of players’ average on-field positioning. Whilst the processual activity of football is more complex and messy than a simple model can express, the model should still have some predictive scope. When we look at the above graphic, we see that the formation could perhaps be expressed as 2-4-2-2. The full-backs push on to be level with the central midfielders, with the centre-backs, based on Cartesian coordinates, essentially the only defenders.

This indicates that we do not apprehend player positioning merely based upon coordinates: we also assess the game with regard to the human significance attached to the use of space. Heidegger’s notion of Dasein shows that our spatial relation with objects is based upon how we define space with regard to the specificity of human activities or being-in-the-world. Closeness and distance therefore only have meaning in relation to aspects of existence relevant to our being: on this basis, the friend I am waving to across the street is closer than the pavement underneath me of which I am unaware. Cartesian ontology is thus an abstraction from our understanding of space as a region of existence inextricably linked to meaningful human activity. Dasein is why we do not view football formations as 2-4-2-2, despite average on-field positions.

Average on-field positions are less vital to us when considering how teams line-up, than the understanding of the value of each position. For example, football fans know that, despite the full-back having licence to push forwards down their flank, their primary responsibility is defence. The key activity for the full-back is that which takes place when they join the centre-backs in defending the goal. On-field positioning suggests that full-backs are midfielders, but defensive work is fundamental to their role, with attacking forays crucial but ancillary. This is why, despite graphical representations to the contrary (as above), we consider that teams usually line up with four defenders.

Formations are ontological and epistemological: they do not simply represent what exists on the pitch, but show us how humans organise their understanding of the game. Rather than reflecting an external physical reality, formations capture a social reality which is more meaningfully expressed when mathematical coordinates are partially eschewed.

Understanding Organizations

Management guru Charles Handy highlights that there are four main types of organizational culture.
 
The power culture is associated with small entrepreneurial organizations. With influence emanating from a key central source the power culture can be conceived as a web. The strands of the web provide a conduit for the influence from the central power source. Argentina, winners of World Cup 1986, represent an example of a power culture. The central figure in this team was Maradona, one of the greatest and most influential footballers ever. As a central motivating force, his talent and presence cascaded as a positive influence through the rest of the side and this ensured victory on this occasion. It didn’t prove quite so successful in 1990 however when a weaker Argentina side, still inspired by Maradona, lost to Germany in the final. This shows that, whilst a spider can weave a web, it can’t carry one!
 
The role culture is often found in bureaucratic organizations. These organizations are predicated upon specialized functions, such as finance and HR, which operate within clear procedural parameters. Role requirements take primacy over the skills of any individual incumbents. A range of individuals could fulfil a specific role, as long as the function remains appropriately resourced. Greece from Euro 2004 demonstrate a side that successfully embraced a role culture. Senior manager, Otto Rehhagel presided over a well-organized functional unit which managed to overcome more celebrated teams with flimsier organization. There were no major personalities in the Greek team, but they triumphed due to the players fulfilling their role requirements effectively in the pursuit of organizational goals.
 
The task culture is project or activity-oriented. With influence dispersed across various loci of expertise, a net can pictorially represent this organizational culture. Under this culture, professional expertise is more crucial than personal or positional power. This is a highly flexible culture in which teams can be quickly convened to meet a specific objective, and then disbanded. The Netherlands team which made the World Cup final in 1974 are the most appropriate footballing exemplars of the task culture. The Dutch played a brand of ‘total football’ which required a high level of player adaptability: this style of football depended on players switching positions with their colleagues in the endeavour to outmanoeuvre their opponents. There is less depth of specialization, but a task-orientated culture can creatively respond to the ad hoc challenges which arise throughout a game of football.
 
In a person culture the individual is the key unit. The organization is a nominal entity and ancillary to the individuals which comprise it: there are no overarching objectives beyond the aspirations of these individuals. A successful version of this culture was realised by Brazil at World Cup 1970. Brazil played a free-flowing game built on the attacking abilities of individuals such as Jairzinho, Tostao and Pele. The heat of Mexico prevented other teams from compressing the space which the Brazilians required for the expression of their skills. However, at Spain 1982 this culture did not serve Brazil so well. A team with talents such Zico, Eder and Socrates required a draw against Italy to progress to the semi-finals. Without a more robust culture to temper individualistic attacking proclivities, they lost 3-2.
 
What type of organizational culture will triumph at World Cup 2010?

England team v Algeria

Against Algeria, Fabio Capello should employ the same approach as that utilized against USA. Frank Lampard and Steven Gerrard should continue in central-midfield – but Gareth Barry should be afforded some playing time (he can then start against Slovenia.) Without a fit and functioning Barry, Capello is severely limited with regard to how he can configure his midfield. A midfield comprising all three of the above players provides a more robust platform for the side, and this will be crucial when stronger teams are faced in the later rounds. This would move Gerrard back out to the left, and this provides him with more scope to break into attacking areas without compromising the shape of the team. In the absence of a secure/fully fit alternative for central-midfield, Gerrard will be unable to take up this inside-left role, nor a more advanced central position in a 4-2-3-1. For the time being, however, a Gerrard/Lampard axis provides England with a creative midfield engine room.

Emile Heskey showed his value to the side again at the weekend and was probably man of the match. He won a substantial amount in the air and provided a powerful advanced apex to the team structure. Despite his lack of composure in front of goal, he remains the best partner for Wayne Rooney in attack. There is some suggestion that Capello is faced with a tactical dilemma and that Heskey might make way if England make the latter stages of the tournament – with Rooney spearheading the attack as a lone forward in front of Gerrard. Capello is so engrossed by this dilemma he has given the aforementioned Rooney/Gerrard combination a total of 45 minutes playing time – back in 2008! The target-man function will be an increasingly important outlet against the tournament’s best organized teams. There’s little point isolating Rooney in attack against technically adept opposition that will retain the ball well. In such circumstances Rooney will be best deployed behind a forward such as Heskey who can create space via selfless legwork.

Jamie Carragher’s lack of pace was exposed by Jozy Altidore on Saturday, and Algeria would surely seek to exploit a slightly sluggish Carragher/John Terry central-defensive pairing. Carragher is a fine defender, but (with Ledley King absent) Michael Dawson or Matthew Upson could push for a starting place. Upson performed capably next to Terry over the qualifiers, but isn’t the quickest of centre-backs either, whilst Dawson offers more pace but lacks Upson’s international experience. I’ve opted for Dawson, as a pace-free central-defence could become an increasingly sizable millstone as the tournament progresses.  But this area of the team will remain a minor concern whoever is selected.

The key change I would make to the side is on the left-flank. James Milner and Shaun Wright-Phillips were both slightly disappointing against USA. Therefore Joe Cole should come into the line-up. Cole is a confident and influential attacking player at international level. With a flyer like Lennon on the right, Cole would offer a broader range of attacking attributes on the left and could move infield if necessary to take up more playmaking duties. If Aaron Lennon fails to fire on the right, then Wright-Phillips could be introduced.

Following Robert Green’s unfortunate error, I’ve selected Joe Hart for goal. Hart looked confident in the pre-tournament game against Japan and should have the self-assurance required to take on an increasingly scrutinized role. I’m not sure Green could be trusted to retain his composure after such a shattering error against USA. Ideally, Green will be selected and have a good game, thereby re-establishing his confidence and position as No.1.

Complete the joke…

Fabio Cannavaro, Frank Lampard and Thierry Henry were travelling around Africa on holiday. Upon arrival in a village the locals greeted the three of them cheerily and took them to meet the tribe elder.

The three players waited nervously outside the elder’s dwelling. Fabio Canavarro was called in first and stood in front of the elder. “Fabio Canavarro” stated the elder, “I present you with a rock from a nearby hill. This represents the defensive solidity and durable spirit of the central defender.” Fabio Cannavaro said “Thank you” as he accepted the gift and left the dwelling.

Next to enter was Frank Lampard. “Frank Lampard” stated the elder, “I present you with sand from the nearby desert. This represents the grit and granular omnipresence of the box-to-box midfielder.” Frank Lampard said “Thank you” as he accepted the gift and left the dwelling.

The last to enter was Thierry Henry. “Thierry Henry” stated the elder, “I present you with…”