Throughout the qualification campaign it appeared that Fabio Capello had struck upon a workable formula. His England side were arranged under 4-4-2, but it appeared that 4-2-3-1 inhered in this approach as Gareth Barry and Frank Lampard were conservative in central midfield and Wayne Rooney would drop deep from attack. Capello also fielded a target man, Emile Heskey, so that he could provide an advanced apex for the team structure. Steven Gerrard tucked in from left-midfield to help out in central areas when required. An orthodox winger, such as Theo Walcott or Aaron Lennon, was placed on the right.
This approach did not yield great success over World Cup 2010. England left the tournament having beaten just one team‚ Slovenia. Tournament football does come down to fine margins: whilst the international elite are fairly hermetic, isolated events can still be the difference between an excellent and indifferent tournament for a second-tier nation. If it was not for Robert Green’s unfortunate error against the US, then England should have won Group C. This outcome would have opened up the knock-out rounds much more kindly for England, and they could have made the semi-finals. And whilst Germany very much deserved to beat England in the initial knock-out round, it was only an incorrect decision from the officials which prevented the score from being levelled late in the first-half. Entering the second-half on equal terms would have left England less vulnerable to an excellent counterattacking side.
Capello did deviate somewhat from the strategic pattern that he had established over the qualifiers. For example, Jermain Defoe replaced Heskey following the Algeria game. Whilst Defoe scored the winner against Slovenia his broader contribution was slight and Capello should perhaps have reverted to a target-man for the Germany game. Against superior opposition, Heskey or Peter Crouch might have offered the team a broader range of attributes than a goal-poacher such as Defoe. James Milner also came into the side, as a more pragmatic right-sided option than Aaron Lennon. Whilst Milner played well against Slovenia, he made little impact against Germany.
Better England line-up v Germany?
The inclusion of Gerrard on the left worked over the qualifiers as he had the freedom to drift inside to influence the play. But in South Africa this ploy merely unbalanced the side. Against Algeria in particular, England seemed to be playing a lopsided 4-1-3-2 with no left-midfielder in place at all (when 4-3-3 would have been a better configuration against Algeria’s three-man central-defence). The populist call was to play Gerrard centrally behind Rooney. But Rooney did not carry his good form from the Premier League into this tournament and would have been ill-equipped for a lone-forward role. Against Germany it may have been a better ruse to move Gerrard centrally and position Rooney on the left. This would have reinforced the team in midfield, and Rooney’s presence on the flank might have meant that Thomas Muller would have been more distracted by defensive duties.
The central-midfield was also exposed at World Cup 2010. Neither Barry nor Lampard is a natural holding player, with Lampard very much an attacking midfielder at club level. They may have provided a pragmatic pairing over the qualifiers, but were undone badly against Germany. During the tournament it became apparent that 4-2-3-1 does not inhere in Capello’s 4-4-2: operating within an outmoded system England were overrun, outmanouevred and unable to respond to the tactical superiority of Germany (and Algeria).
England missed a genuine defensive midfielder such as Owen Hargreaves who would at least have offered pace and snappy challenges in front of the back four. A fit and in form Rio Ferdinand would also have helped. So injuries and bad luck may have hindered this campaign, but the Capello Project lost both flexibility and coherence over World Cup 2010, as England were again exposed as being some way short of the best international sides.