England: Plan D

3-6-1 up against 4-2-2-2

Fabio Capello has applied a coherent strategic approach since he took over as England coach. However, rumours abound that Capello is to dispense with consistency and deploy a 3-5-2 formation in South Africa. However, the 3-5-2 is almost obsolete as a core approach. WCC has highlighted how formations evolve in response to previous on-pitch configurations. The three-man central defence waned some years ago as sides could line up under 4-5-1/4-3-3 in response. The wingers under this model would occupy the wing-backs defensively meaning that the 3-5-2 had no attacking width and became 5-3-2 in practice. Three central defenders were left marking just one centre-forward, whilst the three-man central-midfield (which used to have an advantage over the two central-midfielders of a 4-4-2) were now presented with a numerically even contest.

Capello’s 4-4-2/4-2-3-1 template worked well for England over a successful but relatively unchallenging qualification campaign. But the greatest indication that England fall some way short of the best international sides was provided in the 2009 friendly against Spain. England were given the run around in this game and were quite obviously second best. Spain, like Brazil, often field a 4-2-2-2 formation. This enables the technically-gifted midfield to dominate games. Attacking width under this approach is often provided by the full-backs: the support afforded by the strong central-midfield means that they have the scope to push forwards. 4-2-2-2 has arisen, as four central-midfielders can overrun sides playing 4-5-1 in central areas – this dominance thus allows the full-backs to provide the attacking width, as high levels of possession will prevent opposing wide players from advancing.

However, with the focus on full-backs as attacking wide players, the 4-2-2-2 allows the opposition to field a more compact defence. A three-man central defence could thus make a return. Up against the narrow 4-2-2-2 approach, a 3-6-1 presents an even match-up in central-midfield, and the secure central defence also frees-up the wing-backs/wide-midfielders to a greater degree. A key way to overcome the 4-2-2-2 is to prevent the full-backs from advancing, as this substantially limits the attacking width of the team. Although the 3-6-1 only has two players designated to the flanks, the even match-up in central midfield, allied to the reinforcement of a three-man central-defence, means that the wide players are afforded more freedom to attack than the opposition’s full-backs. The wide players under 3-6-1 should therefore be considered wingers rather than wing-backs. With the opposition’s full-backs driven backwards, their central-midfield will be starved of distribution outlets.

If one of the forwards of the 4-2-2-2 wishes to drop deep or wide then a defender can follow them without concerns that the defence will be exposed. Greece adopted this approach at Euro 2004 (up against a more othodox 4-4-2) when their 3-6-1 squeezed the life out of France: Seitaridis was part of the three-man central-defence but also man-marked Thierry Henry. Greece did revert to a four-man defence when required, for example when playing against the 4-2-3-1 of Portugal in the final. In addition, Liverpool won the Champions League Final in 2005 by utilizing a three-man defence in the second-half: the extra midfield resources nullified AC Milan’s narrow midfield diamond and also helped John-Arne Riise to prevent attacking full-back Cafu from advancing.

England: 3-6-1

The graphic to the left shows how England might line-up under a 3-6-1 (if Rooney pushes forward it readily mutates into 3-5-2.) Glen Johnson would be an alternative for the right, but I’ve selected the personnel so that it’s easy to return to Plan A if the opposition switch to a formation with a single centre-forward. I don’t believe Capello will subvert his 4-4-2/ 4-2-3-1 approach in South Africa, but 3-6-1/3-5-2 could be called up as Plan D when required.