The current formational hegemony in football converges on 4-2-3-1. This is can be considered either a 4-5-1 with a staggered midfield, or a mutation of 4-4-2 with a withdrawn forward and two deep central midfielders. As this is the current orthodoxy, teams tend to measure up to each other quite closely in terms of configuration – especially in central areas. In central positions, two central defenders mark one centre forward and therefore have the capacity to pick up a break from midfield. In central midfield it is usually three matched against three. In numerical terms this is obviously evenly balanced, but spatially it is also balanced considering the tendency to skew towards defensive security: two defensive midfielders marshall one attacking midfielder. It is perhaps on the flanks, under the current orthodoxy, where the symmetry can be broken, which indicates that modern games may be won by the team which gains control of wide areas. Whilst the space in central areas is squarely contested, the lack of formational symmetry on the flanks means that the battle for territory is more open.
Under 4-2-3-1, two full-backs play on respective flanks with a wide midfielder in front of them. Whilst it is two versus two on the flanks, space is not clearly allocated: the wide midfielders have a combination of attacking and defensive duties, so don’t consistently push forward to occupy the defensive space of the opposing full-back. This creates additional opportunities for wide players to break free of structural constraints, and means that full-backs can often be an unmarked ‘remainder’ when joining an attack.
Obviously there is not a clear demarcation between central and wide areas and activity in one area will have an impact on the broader game. It will be very difficult for wide players to seize control of their flank if the team is being overrun in other areas of the pitch. There is however a broader framework for negotiation on the flanks (in comparison with central areas) within which the wide players can try to impose themselves upon their touchline-hugging rivals.
So it is possible under present footballing orthodoxy that full-back is the most important position. Whilst the full-backs’ primary duty is defence, the space they are often afforded means they can also be a team’s most potent attacker. Whilst the centrally located players are shuffling around playing midfield chess, wide players have the space to formulate attacking manoeuvres that can break the shackles of the cagiest quarter-final fixture.
Interesting. That must be why David Moyes insists on playing Tony Hibbert. Any insight into how Phil Neville gets a game?
We’ve seen in recent seasons a few premier league teams use a single front man as a wide outlet, with varying levels of success. Crystal Palace in 2004/2005 played Andy Johnson as a lone frontman with instruction to provide a wide outlet.
For a Palace team arguably facing stronger opposition week in week out Johnson provided an outlet so palace could soak up pressure, then stretch teams and create chances on the break.
Johnson socred 20 odd goals that season and palace almost stayed up.
More recently Darren Bent played up front alone for Charlton, again with success on a personal notes with bags of goals, however the team struggled.
Most recently last season Aston Villa had their best spell with Agbonlahor as a lone front man with a similar brief. Whilst he did not score as many goals personally as Johnson and Bent, his team enjoyed greater success. The introduction of Heskey and two up front in the January transfer window appeared to contribute to a drop in form for Villa.
In addition to Johnson, Bent and Agbonlahor, Henry and Anelka performed this role admirably at Arsenal and Chelsea respectively.
Taking the release ball from the back, holding it up on the wing and then looking to come inside of the defender, usually with devastating consequences.
Henry of course. How could I forget.